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1 Introduction
Consideration of the socioeconomic ripple effects
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the impact of the
‘triple F’ (food, fuel and finance) crisis, the
failure of economic growth to impact broadly on
poverty reduction and the increasing pressure to
show progress towards the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), would seem to
make social protection the policy instrument of
choice in low-income countries. Yet, in some of
the countries with the worst chronic poverty,
scepticism regarding social protection appears to
prevail, despite exposure visits to Latin America,
tailor-made training courses, much generation
and communication of evidence regarding the
positive impacts of social protection initiatives
and increasing donor commitments.
Zambia, in particular, has been criticised for a
lack of government commitment to social
protection generally, but especially to social cash
transfers (SCT). SCT started in Zambia in
Kalomo district as a donor-funded initiative in
2003, and was later extended to five districts.
This pilot project aimed to generate evidence
and offer government and the Ministry
responsible – Community Development and
Social Services (MCDSS) – the necessary
information and skills to demonstrate the value
of social protection for citizens who have limited
or no productive capacity. The SCT was proposed
alongside other social protection interventions,
as illustrated by the first national Social
Protection Strategy in 2005.
While small victories have been won, such as the
creation of a budget line for SCT, maintaining a
degree of funding for other interventions,
deploying more staff and winning over allies
(some Members of Parliament and a few
previously opposed Ministers), progress overall
has been slow. For example, it has taken the
Ministry almost three years to scale-up the SCT
beyond the five initial pilot districts, and
development partners still foot most of the bill.
Piloting and experimentation continue (SCT are
now targeted to the ‘incapacitated’ in some
districts, to the elderly in others and to children
in the most recent districts) with, however, little
political commitment to take the SCT forward –
in whatever form. Increased funding for other
important social protection interventions has
been equally elusive.
Academics and development practitioners have
sought answers as to why pro-poor social
protection has not taken stronger root in
Zambia, starting as early as 2005 with a ‘drivers
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of change’ study (Barrientos et al. 2005); studies
featuring Zambia in 2008 (Lindström 2008); in
2009 (Habasonda 2009; McCord 2009) and in
2010 (Devereux et al. 2010; Devereux and White
2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010). Is the stagnation
that we currently observe because stakeholders
in Zambia resisted policy recommendations and,
if so, why? Is it because recommendations were
wrong-headed or inadequate, or is it a mistake to
conclude that we see no progress in Zambia?
2 The politics behind social protection in Zambia
Donors supporting social protection in Zambia
endeavoured to analyse political processes to see
how social protection might better fit the local
political agenda. A key document was the Drivers
of Change for Social Protection analysis in 2005
(Barrientos et al. 2005). That report identified
several barriers to social protection
interventions: a tendency towards a
‘massification of poverty’, the complex and
impenetrable language employed and a MCDSS
with low human, organisational and financial
capacity. It argued that donors must push for a
stronger focus on the poor and vulnerable and
encouraged them to make use of existing
institutions, engage with powerful social and
economic sector ministries and the Minister and
Ministry of Finance, to ally with civil society and
research institutions and to prioritise monitoring
and evaluation.
Here, in response to the identification of these
weaknesses and the recommendations made, we
examine the nature of the social protection
policy process in Zambia and trace why a
political contract between government and its
citizens for social protection has not been
established. Deconstructing possible explanatory
factors, we look at institutional features, the
overall discourse on poverty, the existing
knowledge base for policymaking, different
drivers of change and implications for the design
and implementation of social protection
programmes.
2.1 Institutional features
Putting social protection into the broader context
Recent social protection analyses in Zambia may
have underplayed the broader policy and
programming context while shining rather too
harsh a spotlight on social protection. We argue
that, in the context of Zambia’s long-term
economic decline from middle-income to low-
income status, and the resulting (and
concomitant) structural adjustment processes, a
policy and funding void emerged around
responses to poverty which persists today.
Poverty alleviation was subsumed under growth
while government investment across the board
has been shaped by the dynamics of the shadow
political economy, dominated by a patron–client/
patrimonial/prebendalist rationale. Poverty and
vulnerability responses by government have,
consequently, been piecemeal, underfunded and
projectised, and often delivered through non-
government channels.
The real national agenda and the magnitude of
challenges ahead are revealed by the budget
allocation for poverty alleviation and social
protection measures. In 2010, the MCDSS
budget ceiling was fixed at 0.5 per cent of total
government revenue (about US$15.5 million).
The allocation for Food Security Packs, a
national programme to support poor small-scale
farmers, represented just 13 per cent of this
small budget, while that for the in-kind transfers
provided by the Public Welfare Assistance
Scheme (PWAS) – also supposed to be a national
programme – amounted to 7 per cent of the
entire MCDSS budget (Ministry of Finance and
National Planning 2010). To fund a national SCT
scheme targeting 10 per cent of households (for
calculations see ILO 2008), the present MCDSS
budget would have to be doubled.
Personalised decision-making
Where there have been significant shifts in social
protection policy, a careful examination reveals
their highly personal and opportunistic nature.
For example, until October 2005, rural health
user fees, introduced in the 1990s, seemed a
fixture and the Ministry of Health was firmly pro-
user fees. The reform trigger was an idiosyncratic
combination of factors and events: the Minister, a
visionary champion able to manipulate free
political space due to her non-membership of the
ruling party, motivated by a personal encounter
with poverty, teamed up with a donor that was
able to mobilise support quickly. Similarly, the
former Minister of the MCDSS managed in 2007
to mobilise rapidly a significant budget for street-
children, partly to the detriment of the national
in-kind transfer programme. A personal interest
became a political priority for these particular
actors, enabling them to change a political course
of action.
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Political spaces
Unfortunately, then and now, unofficial policy
space is often more important and more difficult
to influence. Political economy analyses suggest
that: ‘Zambia has long been characterized by a
disconnect between its formal institutional
structure, and the informal “rules of the game”’
(Levy and Palale 2007: 10).
Since independence, important constituencies in
Zambia, either ethnic, linguistic, regional or
political elites or a mixture, have been balanced
through access to patronage rents of one form or
another. These ‘mutual guarantees of economic
and political support within social networks’
inhibit the functioning of the ‘mechanisms of
performance-based accountability’ (Posner and
Simon 2002: 332) and do not provide easy entry-
points for outsiders to influence policy. The
seismic political and economic shifts from the
1990s onwards – continuing economic decline as
well as a split in the governing party and the
almost total disintegration of the opposition party
– did little to reduce the informal policy space.
The focus on rent creation and allocation for
political management meant that unofficial
political–economic imperatives were as
important as official ones, but even less likely to
be pro-poor. Both official pro-growth and
unofficial pro-rent generation dynamics limit the
space and the paths along which the poor might
be able to make themselves heard, and thus
complicate the inception of national social
protection interventions.
Accountability
In Zambia today, political accountability remains
limited. It is not clear to what extent politicians
who fail to deliver are voted out of power. To
whom must an MP deliver? Dependence on
relations with the leaders of the party for the
resources and opportunity to be elected means
that constituents have much less influence than
the formal structure suggests. A study examining
factors of support for the 1991 and 1996 elections
at sub-national level found ‘non-economic factors
such as urban–rural location and ethnic
background to have been at least as important as
economic factors in shaping voters’ behaviour’
(Posner and Simon 2002: 319). They also found
evidence that along the familiar exit/voice/loyalty
spectrum, exit – in terms of not voting/abstaining
– was still, as under the single party system,
regarded as a valid strategy. Evidence of a small
shift away from prebendalist voting patterns by
Posner and Simon (2002) is a sign that
incumbents will increasingly be judged on their
performance in office. This accountability bodes
well for the future of social protection.
Towards a social contract?
The coexistence of official and unofficial policy
spaces leaves the majority of the population
excluded from policy influence. Yet, for a social
contract to emerge, it has to be recognised by
both sides and, to some extent, be enforceable.
Despite the fact that social protection is
gradually being institutionalised and integrated
into the Social Security Policy, the draft Social
Welfare Policy, the National Development Plan
and so on, nothing yet allows citizens to take the
government to court, as in countries like South
Africa. A key issue in Zambia’s Constitution
debates concerned whether access to education
could be a right, let alone the progressive
realisation of social and economic rights. The
fact that the draft Constitutional Bill has
included a ‘right to social protection’ is, however,
extremely promising with respect to the longer-
term future of social protection.1
2.2 Discourse and thinking on poverty
Elites
How is poverty understood by Zambians? A mixed
picture emerges from political elites as well as
the broader public. Earlier studies suggested that
the elite (the wealthiest 3–5 per cent of the
population) feared welfare traps and irreversible
political commitments. Commentators have
argued that elites prefer tools directed at the
‘productive poor’ (Barrientos et al. 2005; Hickey
2007). However, there is evidence that this view
has shifted and we now find a more nuanced view
within the Ministry of Finance (Lindström 2008;
RuralNet 2008), a richer debate on social
protection in Parliament (Zambian Parliament
2010) and, in policy terms, social protection, once
a side chapter in the 5th National Development
Plan, is being considered as a right in the new
Constitution.
Public opinion
What do ‘ordinary Zambians’ think about the
incapacitated poor? We argue here that ordinary
Zambians do care – as much as they can afford to –
and show this in their daily actions through taking
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in orphans or participation in faith-based care
organisations. This is also confirmed by a small
political attitude survey,2 exploring how Zambians
understand ‘the poor’ and the acceptability of
various responses to poverty (Schüring 2010).
Respondents, broadly speaking, accept that there
are structural causes of poverty, simultaneously
expect high levels of individual responsibility but
accept that some people should be given non-
contributory support. There is a strong feeling
that the government has a primary responsibility
for care of the poor. Only a tiny percentage, when
asked to imagine themselves as policymakers,
denied any form of support to the poor.
2.3 Knowledge base – the right message to the right
people?
Merging science with reality
In Zambia, numerous studies have been
commissioned on the impact of SCTs, their
operational efficiency with regard to targeting,
payments, incentives, conditionality and
institutional arrangements and fiduciary risks.
Much effort was given to ensuring the process
was transparent and credible, data and studies
were shared with a wider audience and areas for
improvement were highlighted along with
achievements. In short, an evidence base for
Zambia has been constructed as recommended
in the ‘drivers of change’ study (Barrientos et al.
2005).
Unfortunately, policymakers do not base decisions
on evidence alone; this applies in particular to the
‘true believers’ (Pritchett 2002). The former
Zambian Minister of Finance, a ‘true believer’
that cash transfers would either be captured or
mis-spent, based his view on his personal
experience as an agricultural credit officer and a
few cash transfer recipients in his home district,
rather than examining the broader and more
positive evidence. This means that a randomised
broad-scale experiment is unlikely to have
provided a tipping-point. Evidence is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for social protection
in any country where personalities and other
policy considerations dominate.
Market social protection better?
A key question in Zambia is whether stakeholders
found the right channels of communication for
social protection and whether, in particular, they
failed to emphasise its potential to stimulate local
economic growth. Finding the right language and
evidence is crucial in addressing the concerns and
fears of a Ministry of Finance. However, there is a
real risk of claiming social protection as a silver
bullet and/or not recognising the budgetary
implications and difficult allocation decisions that
governments face.
If SCT programmes are promoted primarily on
their propensity to promote growth, they will be
assessed against other productive programmes
and will probably fail the test. This would take us
back to growth with no protection for those least
able to participate. Also, while the ILO (2008)
has advocated that a minimum package of
universally acceptable benefits is affordable,
even a social protection budget around 1 per cent
of GDP means a significant budget increase for
countries like Zambia that mobilise only about
25 per cent of GDP as government revenues.
2.4 Drivers of change – going the right way?
Civil society needs to step up
Civil society in Zambia is a diverse group of
organisations, active in lobbying for the poor and
vulnerable and delivering many vital services on
the ground. Mass movement has arisen only at
crucial moments in the democratic evolution.
Otherwise, sporadic pressure has been exerted
on the government and only by some
organisations. In social protection, civil society
has mainly played a consultative role, although
the initiative of a civil society platform for social
protection has gained some momentum of late.
Is it fair to suggest that civil society has failed to
provide national leadership on social protection?
A more sophisticated and dynamic
understanding of the limitations of civil society
in a country such as Zambia would suggest not.
The shrinking of the middle class and absence of
a pro-poor activist elite means Zambian NGOs
are almost entirely dependent on funding from
external sources. Civil society engagement is
curtailed by lack of funds and activities are
curtailed by donor strategies. The NGO Bill in
2009 further limited room for manoeuvre
through introducing a government-dominated
Registration Board that approves or denies the
establishment or mandatory re-registration of
NGOs (Vind-Andersen 2009).
The influence that civil society could and can bring
to bear in Zambia is therefore highly constrained.
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Donors taking too much of the initiative
Have donors taken too much of the initiative in
social protection? Our finding is to the contrary,
that donors, overall, did not take sufficient
initiative given the presence of a policy void that
was damaging to the poor and vulnerable. This is
not to argue that donors should attempt to
impose their preoccupations on the policymaking
process but they should certainly act to support
local actors, institutions and processes that
benefit the poor and vulnerable.
Donor initiatives in social protection in Zambia
have followed more than one agenda, which
might not have fostered consistency in
policymaking and ministerial ownership. In their
defence, however, it must be stated that
development partners made extensive use of
official policy space, particularly through the
Technical Working Groups (TWG) that fed into
the Sector Advisory Group (SAG). Without the
support of donors, poverty and social protection
would not have risen on the agenda of those who
make decisions and MCDSS would not have the
same capacity and clout as today.
Appropriate institutions
Academics and practitioners in social protection
debate at length whether to work with existing or
new institutions. Many advocate that a more
powerful ministerial home would further the
agenda and that working with weak Social Affairs
ministries is self-defeating. There are some
serious difficulties with this suggestion, however.
To shift a social transfer programme from the
ministry which holds a mandate presupposes an
interest in the recipient for inter-sectoral
adoption. In the Zambian context, this was a non-
starter. The Minister of Finance was one of very
few Ministers of Finance absent from the regional
Livingstone conference on social protection
(hosted in Zambia!) in 2006 and he was reluctant
in 2007 to sign an SCT grant agreement for which
the MCDSS lobbied strongly. Furthermore, social
protection interventions at a time when donors
are preoccupied with alignment, harmonisation,
division of labour and delivering results need to
promote government systems and to support a
broader Ministry of Social Affairs mandate, rather
than elevate a single intervention.
The government?
Most critics of the failure of social protection
bemoan a lack of ‘political will’, and this is also
true for Zambia. But the contested concept of
‘political will’ embodies an assumption that
government (a) is a homogeneous and static
body and (b) to a large extent, represents the
will of most of the people. A useful contribution
to the debate on political will would be to
deconstruct ‘the government’ into its different
actors and to undertake a more dynamic analysis
of stakeholders.
Social protection in Zambia does have its
supporters. MCDSS, once viewed as a passive
actor in social protection (Barrientos et al. 2005)
has evolved into an active, informed and more
determined driver of change (Devereux and
White 2010) that handles the previously baffling
language of social protection with relative ease.
Several MPs have recognised the political
potential behind the SCT scheme and lobbied for
the scheme to be extended to their constituencies.
To this, one can add the evidence presented above
on public opinion regarding government’s
responsibility for poverty reduction and (some)
social assistance. Strategically, strengthening
rather than criticising these stakeholders in the
Zambian regime that promote social protection
would be more constructive.
2.5 Design and implementation – the devil in the detail?
A further explanation offered for the failure (or
slow momentum) of social protection interventions
has been that the interventions are inappropriate.
Best as enemy of the good?
Devereux and White (2010) suggest that donors
support technically superior but politically
unpopular social protection interventions rather
than supporting those programmes to which
government is fully committed. While
strengthening politically popular programmes
seems a sensible avenue to take, we also have to
critically ask ourselves why certain interventions
– such as the Fertiliser Support Programme in
Zambia – enjoy greater priority and support from
the Ministry of Finance and to what extent they
can be labelled as social protection. A recent
World Bank evaluation (2010) demonstrates that
the political attractiveness of this programme
derives not from its pro-poor impact per se but
from the political buy-in of better-off farmer
recipients. How far such a programme can be
fine-tuned to make it more pro-poor is hard to
say if its unspoken aim is to reward those who
can rally party support.
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Another critical question is whether existing
social protection schemes can be expanded and
improved. This requires a critical assessment of
the extent to which existing interventions such
as the in-kind support delivered through the
Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) of the
MCDSS offer social protection, or employ
mechanisms able to sustain a higher caseload, or
enjoy political support. Given the challenges that
PWAS faced in the past (Johnson and Do Rosario
Advirta 2002), it was probably a reasonable
choice to root the social cash transfer pilots in
the old structure but to also test more efficient
new modalities.
Wrong target group and type of support?
Would categorically targeted SCT rather than the
poverty focus of the initial pilots have solicited
more political support? The evidence from public
attitude surveys does not support this, since we
see greatest support across all samples for
targeting the extremely poor, followed by people
with disabilities, for the urban and rural sample
as well as children among students. The political
elites do not seem to be opposed to the target
group of the poor and incapacitated either.
Might conditional support have been politically
more popular? To get political buy-in in the short
term, our attitude survey shows that a
conditional cash transfer might increase political
support. However, conditionality by itself will not
do the trick: indirectly conditioned programmes
such as the food security pack, school feeding or
the in-kind PWAS support, have not received
high levels of domestic financial allocations.
Wrong process – never-ending piloting
The recommendation by Devereux et al. (2010)
that pilots be abandoned in favour of going
national is hard to judge without a counterfactual.
The experience of Lesotho suggests that going
national fast can embed problems that are
avoidable by testing and proceeding more
gradually (Pelham 2007). Not going national can
also be a precautionary measure: in what way
would donor funding to a social protection system
virtually disowned by power brokers in government
be more promising – let alone possible – than the
conservative approach of slowly increasing
government’s financial contributions?
What would count as an acceptable and realistic
timeframe for a programme to go national? A
programme that does not go national overnight
is not necessarily a failure. However, when to call
it a day is a difficult call to make in a country
where policymaking is highly personalised,
volatile and little influenced by the public vote.
Sometimes having patience and perseverance are
necessary for producing policy change.
3 Conclusion
Given the technical potential of social protection
to address chronic poverty and vulnerability,
observing slow progress in low-income countries
as Zambia is frustrating. While also frustrating
for Ministries of Social Affairs, cooperating
donors and analysts, it is most serious for the
poor and vulnerable themselves. Locating and
strengthening the political support for issues low
on the list of priorities for influential political
players is complex, often gradual, and requires a
readiness to seize the moment. This is
particularly true in countries where only some
policymaking or political incentives exist in
official policy spaces. Here, citizens are still
waiting to be able to hold their leaders
accountable and conditions are absent for
government to be viewed as entering into a social
contract with its citizens.
Coming back to our initial questions, this
investigation has highlighted that although
many recommendations from previous studies
were adopted and there was a strong
commitment to engage in an evidence-based
policy process, progress has been painfully slow.
Simultaneously, this article has demonstrated
the complexities of the political manoeuvring
around social protection. Recommendations for
strengthening political support for social
protection are badly needed but must be attuned
to the systemic features and political realities in
Zambia, and must also prioritise the majority
who are still trapped below the poverty line. Last
but not least, more realistic timeframes and
measurements should be employed to gauge
success for complex political processes in low-
income countries, while unfavourable
comparisons with rapid advances in countries
like South Africa or Ethiopia should be avoided.
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Notes
* The authors would like to sincerely thank
Franziska Gassmann for her valuable
comments as well as the team at the Social
Welfare Department of MCDSS for their input.
1 The previous constitution did not grant full
socioeconomic rights. It even restricted basic
rights such as the right to education, claiming
financial and administrative incapacity to do
full justice to it.
2 For more information about the methodology
and more findings, see Schüring (2010).
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